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of the Warsaw Convention Does Not Relate to Venue, But
Rather to Jurisdiction in the International or "Treaty Sense."
Smith v. Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd., 452 F. 2d 798 (2d
Cir. 1971).
Edmund Smith, a United States citizen, purchased a ticket in
Vancouver, British Columbia, for a Canadian Pacific Airways
flight originating in Vancouver and destined for Tokyo. On route,
the aircraft crashed. Smith instituted an action in the Southern
District of New York against Canadian Pacific Airways, alleging
that the district court had jurisdiction under article 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or alternatively, for improper
venue under article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. The motion
was denied; the forum limitations imposed by article 28(1) relate
only to venue and venue was proper because defendant had a place
of business in New York City Held, reversed: Article 28 (1) does
not relate to venue, but rather to jurisdiction in the international or
"treaty sense."
The Second Circuit further announced that in Warsaw Conven-
tion cases a two pronged jurisdictional test must be satisfied before
a suit can be maintained. Plaintiff must establish: (i) treaty juris-
diction-the power of the nation as a whole to hear the case; and
(ii) domestic jurisdiction-the power of the courts within the
nation to hear the case. The plaintiff in Smith failed to establish
treaty jurisdiction because none of the four contacts specified in
article 28(1) were within the United States. Article 28(1) states:
An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plain-
tiff, in the territory of one of the [h]igh [c]ontracting [p]arties,
either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, concluded at Warsaw, Poland, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 300
et seq., T.S. No. 876 (1934) (hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention).
ISmith v. Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd., Civil No. 71-1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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principal place of business, or where he has a place of business
through which the contract has been made, or before the court at
the place of destination.
Since Smith failed to establish treaty jurisdiction in the United
States, it was unnecessary for the Second Circuit to consider the
question of domestic jurisdiction under the federal question and
diversity of citizenship statutes.3
In 1929," the authors of the Warsaw Convention attempted to
solve two major problems facing the then infant airline in-
dustry: first, the potential that adverse judgments from air dis-
asters could completely dissipate air carriers' total capital invest-
ment and second, that air carriers in foreign jurisdictions might
have "formidable difficulties" before the tribunals in "court systems"
that were not well organized. To mitigate these anticipated prob-
lems the draftsman unified the law relating to international car-
riages, ' limited the airlines' liability for injury or death of passen-
gers," and restricted the number of possible forums in which suit
'28 U.S.C. S 1331(a), 1332(a)(2) (1970).
'The Warsaw Convention was the result of two international conferences held
in Paris in 1925 and Warsaw in 1929, and the work done by the interim Comit6
International Technique d'Experts A6riens (CITEJA) created by the Paris con-
ference. Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Conven-
tion, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498 (1967).
'Article 28 does not completely eliminate the possibility of suit in remote
places, but it is clear that the drafters intended the article to limit jurisdiction as
much as possible. 11 Conference International de Droit Privg Aerien, 4-12 Octo-
bre 1929, Varsovie, ICAO Doc. 7838, pp. 77-79; translated in Calkins, The Cause
of Action Under the Warsaw Convention, 26 J. AIR L. & CoM. 217, 229-30
(1959).
6 Warsaw Convention, Article 1(1) shall apply "to all international transpor-
tation . . . performed by aircraft for hire." Article 1(2) defines "international"
transportation as transportation between two countries.
7Articles 17 and 22 of the Warsaw Convention limited liability to 125,000
Poincare francs or approximately 8,300 United States dollars. Improved air safety
and the growth of the airline and insurance industry obviated the low liability
limits that the Convention created. See Kreindler, Denunciation of the Warsaw
Convention, 31 J. AIR L. & CoM. 291 (1965); Stephen, The Adequate Award in
International Aviation Accidents, 531 INS. L.J. 197 (1967). At the insistance of
the United States, the limits of liability were raised to $16,000-nearly twice the
Warsaw limit at the 1955 conference to amend the Convention held at the Hague.
ICAO International Conference on Private Air Law September 1955. See 1, Min-
utes, ICAO, International Conference on Private Air Law XV-XVII (1955). The
Hague Protocol, however, was never ratified by the United States, which felt the
limits were still too low. The United States delegation had sought an increase to
$25,000. See Calkins, Hiking the Limits of Liability at the Hague, 120 (Proceedings
of the Am. Soc'y of Int'l L.) (1962); Kreindler, The Denunciation of the War-
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might be brought.'
The Second Circuit in Smith was dealing with the major area
of the Warsaw Convention that has perplexed the courts since the
Convention's inception. Article 28(1) sets forth four forums in
which suit may be maintained, but the article does not refer to
either "jurisdiction" or "venue." As a result of this omission, Ameri-
can courts have been faced with the question of whether article
28(1) affects the subject matter jurisdiction or is merely a venue
requirement.'
The determination of whether article 28(1) is jurisdictional or
only a venue provision is crucial in deciding where a suit can be
brought. This decision is of utmost importance to American plain-
tiffs who wish to adjudicate their claims in the United States courts
that traditionally give recoveries in excess of those given by courts
in other countries." Thus, the stakes are higher when applying the
article in the United States judicial system. In addition to treaty
jurisdiction, United States courts must deal with the unique prob-
lems of federal jurisdiction and venue.
saw Convention, 31 J. Am L. & COM. 291 (1965). Accordingly, the International
Civil Aviation Organization and the International Air Traffic Association made a
concerted effort to secure an agreement by the principal international airlines to
voluntarily waive liability up to $75,000 under terms of absolute liability to avoid
the announced intention by the United States to denounce the Convention. See
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80
HARV. L. REV. 497 (1967). After the attempts to reach agreement failed, the
Civil Aeronautics Board issued an order imposing strict liability on the airlines
for death or personal injury of passengers up to $75,000 for international flights
originating, stopping or terminating in the United States. CAB Docket No. 17,325;
CAB Order No. E-23680; CAB Agreement No. 18900 (May 13, 1966).
'Warsaw Convention, Article 28(1).
'The jurisdiction versus venue argument raised by article 28(1) has been
further complicated in the United States as the result of controversy whether
the article is national in scope or refers to national sub-divisions. See, e.g., Dun-
ning v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 4 Av. Cas. 17,394 (D.D.C. 1954);
Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 816 (1965).
10 Article 25 takes away the airline's limited liability if the injury was caused
by the airline's "willful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accord-
ance with the law of the court to which the case is submitted, is considered to
be equivalent to willful misconduct."
Since the United States has the highest standard of living of any country in
the world, quite naturally damage recoveries will be greater than in less affluent
countries once a finding of willful misconduct is established. See Cox v. North-
west Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967). There is no question that
awards and settlements have risen throughout the world, but statistics comparing
settlements in the United States with those of other countries are unavailable.
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Varying results will occur depending upon the article 28(1)
interpretation a court chooses. If article 28(1) is jurisdictional
and none of the four contacts are present, the court is without
power to hear the suit. If the article is construed to be a venue
provision, the court may have the power to hear the case, but may
be an improper forum. Moreover, there are major procedural dif-
ferences: if noncompliance with article 28(1) amounts to a defect
in venue, the defect may be waived;" but if it constitutes a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot be waived and the court must
dismiss." The Second Circuit, recognizing this confusion and the
need for a uniform interpretation, sought to remedy this procedural
problem by treating article 28(1) as requiring three separate ju-
dicial determinations: two of which involve the power of the court
to hear the case and the third involves the convenience of the court.
I. TREATY JURISDICTION
In Smith the Second Circuit held that article 28(1) "must be
considered as absolute and mandatory, on the national level, in
the jurisdictional sense, and be given [its] proper status as a treaty
obligation of our nation without equivocation."'" This means that
if none of the four contact points specified in the article could be
found within this country, then the suit could not be tried in any
of the courts of the United States regardless whether there might
otherwise be jurisdiction."
Smith relied on the "place of business through which the con-
tract has been made" to establish treaty jurisdiction. Since it was
clear that the other three provisions of article 28 (1) did not apply,
this was the only provision asserted on appeal."
"Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3).
"Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). See also F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12 (1965).
13 452 F.2d at 801.
14 The conclusion that article 28(1) is mandatory in nature and jurisdictional
in the larger or treaty sense was reached by reading article 28(2) in conjunc-
tion with article 32. Article 28(2) provides that "questions of procedure shall be
governed by the law of the court to which the case is submitted." Article 32
prohibits alteration of the rules as to "jurisdiction." 452 F.2d at 801.
15 452 F.2d at 802. For purposes of article 28(1), the domicile of the carrier
is its place of incorporation. See McHenry, Judicial Jurisdiction Under the War-
saw Convention, 29 J. AIR L. & COM. 205, 208-09 (1963). In Smith, the domicile
of Canadian Pacific Airways (Canada) was not in question. Further, Canadian
Pacific Airways principal place of business had previously been established as
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Smith relied on the decision in Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc.1"
in asserting treaty jurisdiction under the third forum of article
28(1)-"the place of business where the contract was made." In
Eck a round-trip ticket from Zurich to the Mid East was purchased
in California. The ticket for the portion of the trip furnished by
United Arab Airlines was purchased through Scandinavian Air-
lines System although United Arab Airlines maintained a New
York ticket office. The Second Circuit held the suit could be main-
tained in New York since defendant had a place of business that
regularly issued tickets in the United States, and even though the
ticket had not been bought or confirmed through that place of
business the ticket had been bought in the United States. Eck was
based on the concept of agency first applied to this provision of
article 28(1) in Berner v. United Airlines." In Berner plaintiff
purchased a round-trip ticket from New York City to Sydney,
Australia. Although the ticket had been purchased from British
Overseas Commonwealth Airways, transportation was furnished by
British Commonwealth Airways. Following the BCA aircraft's
crash, suit was commenced in a New York state court, which held
that the Warsaw Convention applied and article 28 (1) jurisdiction
was established since the "place of business through which the
contract has been made" was within the United States and BOAC
had acted as BCA's agent when the ticket was sold. Smith is dis-
tinguishable from Eck and Berner. In Smith, plaintiff purchased his
ticket outside the United States, and neither defendant's New York
office nor any other American agency was involved with the pur-
being in Canada. See Parkinson v. Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd., 10 Av. Cas.
17,967 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), on resubmission 10 Av. Cas. 18,237 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Under article 28(1) foreign corporations can have only one principal place of
business, i.e., where the executive and main administrative functions are located
and where most of its business is transacted. See Eck v. United Arab Airlines,
Inc., 360 F.2d 804, 809 (2d Cir. 1966); Nudo v. Societe Anoyme Belge D'Ex-
ploitation De La Navigation Aerieenne Sabena Belgium World Airways, 207 F.
Supp. 191 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); McHenry, Judicial Jurisdiction Under the Warsaw
Convention, 29 J. AIR L. & COM. 205, 209 (1963). The other forum for main-
taining suit specified by article 28(1) is "before the court at the place of destina-
tion." The location of this contact is determined by the destination shown on the
contract of carriage. In Smith, Tokyo, Japan, was the place of destination.
16360 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1966).
"2 Misc. 2d 260, 149 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 8 App. Div. 2d 9, 1571
N.Y.S.2d 884 (1956), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 1003, 147 N.E.2d 732, 170 N.Y.S.2d 340
(1957).
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chase. Neither Eck or Berner had held that merely maintaining
place of business was sufficient to establish jurisdiction.
II. DOMESTIC JURISDICTION
The Second Circuit in Smith, after stating the mandatory nature
of article 28(1) on the treaty jurisdiction level, interpreted article
28(2) to mean that beyond the question of treaty jurisdiction,
domestic law could not be affected."8 This interpretation is not
novel. In Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc."9 plaintiff brought an
action for wrongful death caused by an aircraft accident in Japan.
Suit was commenced in the Southern District of New York, and
the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction." The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that
article 28(1) dictates the country in which an action must be
brought and not a particular court within a country."' Although
Mertens did not speak in terms of treaty jurisdiction, treaty juris-
diction was within the United States since defendant's principal
place of business was in California, the contract was made in Cali-
fornia, and the carrier's place of incorporation was in Delaware.
Treaty jurisdiction thus existing, domestic jurisdiction would not
be disturbed by article 28(1). The same conclusion was reached
in Martino v. Trans World Airlines, Inc."2 In that case after finding
treaty jurisdiction, the court found that domestic jurisdiction could
not be established in Illinois." Since domestic jurisdiction is not
affected by treaty jurisdiction, there is no inconsistency between
Smith and a number of previous decisions construing this article.
Smith, however, was more explicit in explaining the approach
employed.
III. VENUE
The Second Circuit in Smith further concluded that once treaty
and domestic jurisdiction are found to exist, then venue questions
18452 F.2d at 800, 801. See also note 14 supra.
19341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965).
20 Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 35 F.R.D. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
21341 F.2d at 855.
"1961 U.S. and Can. Av. 651 (N.D. Ill. 1961).
21 Transworld Airlines' place of incorporation was Delaware and its principal
place of business was in Missouri. Id. at 652.
RECENT DECISIONS
should be settled in accordance with the United States Judicial
Code.' Again, the Smith court's treatment of venue question arising
under article 28 (1 ) does not represent a departure from the manner
in which previous court decisions have handled this question.
In Dunning v. Pan American World Airways, Inc,' the district
court treated the article as a venue requirement and transferred
the action from the District of Columbia to the Southern District
of New York because Pan American's domicile and principal place
of business were in New York even though Pan American had many
facilities in the District of Columbia. Eck v. United Arab Airlines'
is in accord. Although Eck speaks in terms of venue, and the court
did not specifically address this issue, it is clear that both treaty
jurisdiction and domestic jurisdiction did exist. This is the only
justification for the result reached. The Eck decision offers a good
illustration of the reasons for the confusion surrounding the inter-
pretation of article 28(1). The Smith pragmatic approach, there-
fore, does not pronounce any new standard of judicial interpretation,
but rather clarifies the approach implicitly utilized in previous de-
cisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Amid all the confusion stemming from the application of the
terms of article 28(1), the Smith decision is important for its at-
tempted analytical approach to the uncertainties of the article.
"Much of the case law on the subject is confused and not well
reasoned... [because] the term 'jurisdiction' has been loosely used
in many cases and there appears to be no consistent or logical
pattern of decisional law."' The concept of jurisdiction being on
two levels and the introduction of the concept of "treaty jurisdic-
tion" in dealing with the Convention is a significant step towards
dispelling this confusion. Further confusion could be eliminated if
other courts adopted the approach used in Smith. Despite the gains
made by Smith, the case illustrates the need for reforming the War-
saw Convention and article 28(1) by adding another forum in
"
4See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1970).
'54 Av. Cas. 17,394 (D.D.C. 1954).
26 360 F.2d 804 (1966).
2, Spencer v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 504, 506 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
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which actions can be brought. Indeed, this reform has in fact be-
gun. In recognition of the changed conditions in the industry since
the date of the Convention's adoption, the Guatemala City Protocol
to Amend the Warsaw Convention' has abandoned the protective
spirit of the original Convention. The Guatemala City Protocol
broadens article 28(1) by adding a fifth forum:
in the territory of one of the [h]igh [c]ontracting [p]arties, before
the [c]ourt within the jurisdiction of which the carrier has an estab-
lishment if the passenger has his domicile or permanent residence
in the territory of the same [h]igh [c]ontracting [p]arty."'
This forum would alleviate many of the inequitable results reached
under the present article 28(1) by allowing the carrier to be sub-
ject to suit in any country in which the carrier has an establishment.
Adoption of this fifth forum would mean that the strained inter-
pretations of cases like Eck would no longer be necessary. It would
also allow plaintiffs the opportunity to bring suit in the country in
which he resides and in which the court system is more familiar
and possibly more friendly to him. For these reasons immediate
ratification of the Guatemala City Protocol is strongly urged.'"
Although the Second Circuit reached the correct result under the
present article 28 (1), the detailed approach necessary to reach that
result would no longer be required if the Guatemala Protocol
applied.
Burton Cohen
28 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Guatemala City, March 8, 1971,
official French, English, and Spanish texts in ICAO Doc. 8932 (1971).
29 Id., Chapter I, Art. 12, at 9.
' The United States has signed the Guatemala City Protocol, but it has not
been given to the Senate for ratification. The Protocol will enter into force on
the nineteenth day after deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification. Id.,
Chapter III, Art. 20.
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LABOR LAW--Successorship Doctrine--A SUCCESSOR-
EMPLOYER MUST BARGAIN WITH His PREDECESSOR'S CERTI-
FIED BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE, BUT Is NOT BOUND By
A PRE-EXISTING COLLECTIVE-BARGAINING CONTRACT. NLRB
v. Burns Int'l Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
Wackenhut, a unionized company, provided plant protection
services for the Lockheed Corporation. Both Wackenhut and Burns
International Security Services submitted bids solicited by Lock-
heed for a new service contract. At a pre-bid conference, Burns
was put on notice that Wackenhut's employees were represented by
a union and that a collective-bargaining contract had recently been
signed. Bums was awarded the service contract and proceeded to
hire a majority of Wackenhut's employees, all of whom were repre-
sented by a recently certified union. The union demanded recog-
nition as the bargaining representative of Bums' employees and
also demanded that Bums honor the unexpired, pre-existing col-
lective-bargaining contract with Wackenhut. When Burns refused,
the union filed unfair labor practice charges with the National
Labor Relations Board. The Board found that Burns was a "suc-
cessor-employer," obligated to bargain with the union and to honor
the pre-existing contract.' The Second Circuit agreed that the
bargaining duty should be imposed, but refused to impose the
contractual obligation Held, affirmed: A successor-employer must
bargain with his predecessor's certified bargaining representative,
but is not bound by a pre-existing collective-bargaining contract.
NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
Since the passage of the National Labor Relations Act,' the
National Labor Relations Board has often had to determine whether
either a bargaining or a contractual obligation could be imposed
on the acquirer of an existing business when the predecessor em-
ployer had been so obligated.' While the bargaining obligation
generally remains extant,' and the Board cannot force parties to
2 Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348, 74 L.R.R.M. 1098
(1970).
'William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.
1971).
329 U.S.C. § 141-97 (1970).
4 NLRB v. Hoppes Mfg. Co., 170 F.2d 962, 964 (6th Cir. 1948).
5 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970). The company violated the Act by a bad-faith re-
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agree to substantive provisions in a contract, the issue of whether
the Act requires a successor employer to honor a pre-existing con-
tract after a change in ownership was unsettled prior to Burns.
I. THE DUTY TO BARGAIN
A. Survival of the Duty
Section 8(a) (5) of the Act imposes a duty on an employer to
bargain in good faith with the chosen representatives of his em-
ployees." For this duty to survive a change of ownership,' it must be
shown that the 'employing industry' remained essentially the same
despite the change.'
Assuming the change in ownership does not disturb the 'em-
ploying industry', a union's certification as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the predecessor's employees will survive.9 The new
employer is considered a "successor" and the obligation to bargain
will remain."
fusal to bargain with the union about a proposed contractual provision. In dis-
cussing the Board's remedial powers, the Court noted that the Board is without
power to compel an agreement between the parties.
' The following sections of the Act are the statutory basis for the bargaining
duty: § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970); § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1970); § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970); S 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970).
Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse
to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ... "
Section 8(d) defines "to bargain collectively" as "the performance of the
mutual obligations of the employer and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times, and confer in good faith .. "
Section 9(a) states that the representative must be selected by a majority of
the employees in a unit appropriate for these purposes.
'See NLRB v. McFarland, 306 F.2d 219, 220 (10th Cir. 1962); NLRB v.
Alamo White Truck Serv., 273 F.2d 238, 239 (5th Cir. 1959); NLRB v. Lunder
Shoe Corp., 211 F.2d 284, 286 (1st Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Hoppes Mfg. Co., 170
F.2d 962, 964 (6th Cir. 1948).
'NLRB v. Colten, 105 F.2d 179, 183 (6th Cir. 1939). There had been a
change in ownership and in determining whether the duty to bargain remained,
the court noted: "[I]t is the employing industry that is sought to be regulated and
brought within the corrective and remedial provisions of the Act in the interest
of industrial peace." 105 F.2d at 183.
' The Board's certification raises a presumption of continued union majority
status. See Synco Machine Co., Inc., 62 N.L.R.B. 985, 989, 14 L.R.R.M. 230
(1945). There are, however, "unusual circumstances" that may overcome this
presumption. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103 (1954); NLRB v. Down-
town Bakery Corp., 330 F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 1964). A change in ownership,
by itself, is not an "unusual circumstance" and the bargaining obligation survives.
See Stonewall Cotton Mills, 80 N.L.R.B. 325, 327, 23 L.R.R.M. 1085 (1948).
"0Stonewall Cotton Mills, 80 N.L.R.B. 325, 327, 23 L.R.R.M. 1085 (1948).
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B. Successor Defined
The determination whether the 'employing industry' remains un-
disturbed following a change in ownership can be made only after
close scrutiny.1' The question generally arises after a sale of assets,
merger, consolidation, transfer or other agreement between the
old and new employer;' the analysis should be made in terms of the
succession of employment, with the employer-employee relation-
ship being the most important element," rather than the succession
of employees.' The National Labor Relations Board has developed
certain criteria revolving around the determination of whether
there is a substantial continuity of business operations." The essen-
tial requirement for a finding that the 'employing industry' remained
undisturbed is that this finding be reasonable."
C. Imposing the Duty on Burns
In Burns the successor doctrine was applied to a change in
ownership resulting from competitive bidding between employers"
rather than through the usual successor situation when there is an
agreement between them." This situation was not novel to the
Board and the duty to bargain has been held to remain because:
If however, the employer can assert a good-faith doubt whether the union con-
tinues in a majority status, he can refuse to bargain. Mitchell Standard Corp.,
140 N.L.R.B. 496, 500, 52 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1963). This is allowable because it
would be in violation of the Act if an employer bargained with a representative
that is not the representative of the majority of his employees. International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB (The Bernhard-Altman
Case), 366 U.S. 731, 737 (1961).
" Makela Welding, Inc. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 40, 46 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB
v. Auto Ventshade, Inc., 276 F.2d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 1960).
"1Mainetnance Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1299, 1301, 57 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1964);
Fanning, Labor-Relations Obligations of a Purchaser, 1967 LABOR RELATIONS
YEARBOOK 284, 286.
"8NLRB v. Alamo White Truck Serv., 273 F.2d 238, 242 (5th Cir. 1959).
"'NLRB v. McFarland, 306 F.2d 219, 220 (10th Cir. 1962).
"Fanning, Labor-Relations Obligations of a Purchaser, 1967 LABOR RELA-
TIONS YEARBOOK 284, 286. The criteria include: (i) use of the same plant; (ii)
the same or substantially the same work force; (iii) the same jobs exist under
the same working conditions; (iv) employment of the same supervisors; (v) use
of the same machinery, equipment and methods of production; (vi) manufacture
of the same product or offer of the same services.
"6Tom-A-Hawk Transit, Inc. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1025, 1027 (7th Cir. 1969);
Hackney Iron & Steel Co. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 639, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
17 NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 275 (1972).
"1Maintenance Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1299, 1301, 57 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1964).
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It would be virtually impossible for employees to achieve collective
bargaining rights in an employing industry which is periodically
subject to a possible change of employers if with every change the
employees must again resort to the Board's processes in order to
demonstrate anew their desire to be represented by their formerly
certified bargaining representative."8
This reasoning, which is consistent with the objectives of the Act,"0
balances the rights of owners to make managerial decisions with the
need to protect employees against a sudden change in the em-
ployment relationship."1
The Board, in applying the successor doctrine to Burns, adopted
the trial examiner's findings concerning the continuity of the 'em-
ploying industry' and emphasized the Act's policy of stabilizing
industrial relations."2 The Second Circuit, affirming the Board's de-
termination that Bums was a successor, stressed that Burns com-
menced performance of its contract with a work force consisting
of a majority of former Wackenhut employees."
The Supreme Court affirmed the Board and the Second Circuit
holding that Bums must recognize and bargain with its predeces-
sor's certified bargaining representative.' While the Court adopted
the trial examiner's findings concerning the continuity of the 'em-
18ABC Food Service, Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 426, 428, 73 L.R.R.M. 1052 (1969).
Based on a competitive bidding procedure, ABC Food Service was awarded a
contract. Although it was known that the predecessor had negotiated a collective-
bargaining contract with a certified union, ABC hired sixty-four of his predeces-
sor's eighty-four employees. Other factors remained the same and the union re-
quested ABC to bargain with it. Based on these facts, the Board found ABC to be
a successor and obligated to bargain with and honor the certification of the union.
" Simmons Eng'rs Co., 65 N.L.R.B. 1373, 1377, 17 L.R.R.M. 291 (1946).
The express purpose of the Act is to achieve stability and to promote industrial
peace in labor relations by encouraging collective bargaining. S. REP. No. 573,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935); Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley
Act) S l(b), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970); NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 266 (1938).
21 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964).
22 Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348, 349, 74 L.R.R.M.
1098 (1970).
23William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 911, 915 (2d
Cir. 1971).
2'NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 279 (1972).
The Court stated: "a mere change of employers or of ownership in the employing
industry is not such a 'unusual circumstance' as to effect the force of the Board's
certification within the normal operative period." The "normal operative period"
is established by the Act to be twelve months. Labor Management Relations Act
(Taft-Hartley Act), § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. 5 159(c)(3) (1970).
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ploying industry,"' the carryover of personnel was emphasized."
Consequently, the Court concluded that Bums' bargaining duty did
not arise until after it became obvious that the total work force
would be comprised of a majority of the predecessor's employees.27
Thus, the Court isolated Burns from a typical successor situation.
Burns, therefore, stands for the proposition that when the change
in ownership is not effectuated by an agreement, a successor does
not have an immediate duty to bargain. When there is no agree-
ment, express or implied, continued majority union representation
becomes the determining factor.
In the "no-agreement" successor situation, Burns reasoning con-
trols if and when the duty to bargain arises. While the duty to
bargain generally is imposed on a successor immediately, when
competitors are involved as in Burns, the bargaining duty is not
automatic. It arose in Burns only because a majority of the em-
ployees were already represented by a certified union. This was
determinable only at the completion of all hiring. Thus, when there
is no agreement between employers, an immediate duty to bargain
is not imposed and a Burns-type successor will not violate section
8(a) (5) by refusing to bargain when setting the initial terms of
employment."
This is not the only benefit accruing to the "no agreement" type
of successor. The Burns-type successor's hiring practices will be
scrutinized less than the typical successor's will be. Prior to Burns,
in a successor situation the new employer could not avoid the
bargaining obligation by refusing to hire his predecessor's em-
ployees." The Board traditionally reasoned:
1406 U.S. at 278.
406 U.S. at 281.
z 406 U.S. at 295. Until the employer was certain that the predecessor's bar-
gaining representative would retain a majority, he could not bargain with it. South-
ern Conference of Teamsters v. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 374 F.2d 932, 937
(5th Cir. 1967).
'
8 NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 281 (1972).
29 406 U.S. at 295.
406 U.S. at 294. Subsequent to the decision in Burns, the Sixth Circuit has
interpreted this to hold that any successor is free to unilaterally set the initial
terms and conditions of employment. See NLRB v. Wayne Convalescent Center,
Inc., 69 CCH Lab. Cas. § 12,977 (1972). In view of the Supreme Court's dis-
tinction between types of successors, it is difficult to understand why the courts
will allow the usual successor to do this.
21 Chemrock Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1079, 58 L.R.R.M. 1582 (1965).
1972]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
S.. the individuals employed by the seller of the enterprise must
be regarded as 'employees' of the purchaser as that term is used
in the Act. Such individuals possess a substantial interest in the
continuation of the existing employee status, and by virtue of this
interest bear a much closer economic relationship to the employing
enterprise than, for example, the mere applicant for employ-
ment . . 2
When, as in Burns there is no agreement, the former employees do
not possess this "closer economic relationship;" therefore, a "no-
agreement" successor can avoid the bargaining obligation by limit-
ing his work force to employees not represented by a certified
union.'
II. THE CONTRACTUAL DUTY
It was Congress' intent in passing the National Labor Relations
Act to promote industrial peace through collective bargaining."
Management and labor were to be brought to the bargaining table
in an effort to have them reach their own agreement.' Section 8 (d)
of the Act,' which was enacted to prevent the Board from inter-
fering with the bargaining process," has been interpreted to pro-
scribe the Board from compelling parties to agree on a substantive
contractual term.'
Prior to the Board's decision in Burns, the obligation to honor
a pre-existing collective-bargaining contract had never been im-
posed on a successor." Burns, however, raised the question:
Whether the national labor policy embodied in the Act requires the
successor-employer to take over and honor a collective-bargaining
agreement negotiated on behalf of the employing enterprise by the
predecessor?'
82 151 N.L.R.B. at 1078 (emphasis added).
' ULRB v. Burns Int'l Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 280 (1972). Sec-
tion 8(2) (3), however, will be violated when an employer's hiring practices
manifests the intent to discriminate against union members. 29 U.S.C. § 158(2) (3)
(1970).
4S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935).
1 NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960).
"Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. 5
158(d) (1970). See note 6 supra.
11 NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952).
8H.K. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970).
11 Cruse Motors, 105 N.L.R.B. 244, 245, 32 L.R.R.M. 1285 (1953).
41 Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348, 350, 75 L.R.R.M.
1098 (1970).
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The union in Burns urged that the rationale of John Wiley & Sons
v. Livingston' controlled, and that the obligation to honor the pre-
existing contract should be imposed on Burns.
A. John Wiley & Sons
In Wiley" a unionized company merged with a considerably
larger non-union company. The union contended that it continued
to represent the merged employees and that the employer was
obligated to recognize certain rights that had "vested" under the
prior contract.' Failing to reach an accord, the union commenced
a section 301 action" to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court
was called upon to decide whether an arbitration clause in a col-
lective-bargaining contract survives a merger. ' The Supreme Court
recognized that arbitration plays an integral part in effectuating
national labor policy;" it is "part and parcel of the collective bar-
gaining process itself."' The Court noted:
While the principles of law governing ordinary contracts would
not bind to a contract an unconsenting successor ... a collective-
bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract."
Although the question of whether the entire contract survives a
change in ownership was not reached, the Court did rule that all
employee rights under the prior agreement are not automatically
terminated.' Enforcement of these rights was to be effectuated by
requiring the successor employer to arbitrate questions that his
41376 U.S. 543 (1964).
"4Id.
"376 U.S. at 545.
"Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301, 29 U.S.C. §
185 (1970). This section gives to the courts, rather than the Board, the power
to enforce contractual provisions. See C. MOis, TiE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw
442 (1971).
"John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 546 (1964).
"Id. at 549. This policy was developed by the Steelworkers Trilogy: United
Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960).
4'John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964); United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960).
,"John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964).
49 376 U.S. at 548.
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predecessor would have been bound to arbitrate." Dicta in sub-
sequent circuit cases has expanded the Wiley rationale to allow
enforcement of all of the terms of pre-existing contracts. 1
B. Honoring the Contract
In Burns the Board, faced with the decisions of Wiley and
"Wiley's progeny," concluded that because a collective-bargaining
agreement "covers the whole employment relationship" and "calls
into being ... the common law of a particular industry,"5 a suc-
cessor-employer must honor a pre-existing contract." The Board
extended the Wiley doctrine by finding that a collective-bargaining
contract is not the simple product of a consensual relationship but
like arbitration an extension of the Act."' Reasoning that since a
contract already existed, the Board determined that Bums was
not being required to agree to a proposal or concession in violation
of section 8(d)." Accordingly, in holding a successor bound to
the terms of a pre-existing contract, the Congressional intent mani-
fested in section 8 (d) was furthered by promoting industrial peace
50 376 U.S. at 554.
" United Steelworkers of America v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891,
895 (3d Cir. 1964); Wackenhut Corp. v. International Union, United Plant Guard
Workers, 332 F.2d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1964). These cases indicate that all con-
tract rights survive a change in ownership. The duty to arbitrate, however, is all
that was actually imposed upon the successor in these cases.
1 Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348, 349, 74 L.R.R.M.
1098 (1970).
-1 182 N.L.R.B. at 350.
11 182 N.L.R.B. at 349. Initially, the bargaining obligation of a successor was
found to be "a matter of interpretation of the Act and not of contract." Cruse
Motors, 105 N.L.R.B. 244, 248, 32 L.R.R.M. 1285 (1953). Wiley extended this
by stating that a collective bargaining agreement is not "the simple product of
a consensual relationship." John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543,
550 (1964).
5 But see H.K. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970). The Board's remedial
powers are set forth in § 10(c). National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) S
10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). This section provides:
if ... the Board shall be of the opinion that any person ...has
. . . or is engaging in any . . . unfair labor practice, then the
Board shall . . . issue ... an order requiring such person to cease
and desist ... and to take such affirmative action . . . as will effec-
tuate the policies of the Act ...
The Court in Porter determined that this power did not include the power to
compel agreement to a substantive term of the contract. Although lacking the
remedial power to compel agreement, the Board determined that the Act required
the imposition of the contractual obligation in Burns.
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through requiring adherence to existing agreements. "
The Second Circuit' and the Supreme Court' disagreed with
this rationale. Noting that section 8 (d) was enacted to prevent the
Board from imposing its settlement of the terms of a collective-
bargaining contract, the Supreme Court emphasized that "the Act
does not compel any agreement whatever."" The Court rejected the
logical extension of the Wiley doctrine and distinguished Wiley
from Burns:
The present case [Burns] does not involve a section 301 suit; nor
does it involve the duty to arbitrate. Rather, the claim is that Burns
must be held bound by the contract executed by Wackenhut,
whether Burns has agreed to it or not and even though Burns made
it perfectly clear that it had no intention of assuming that contract.
Wiley suggests no such open-ended obligation.'
Nevertheless, the Court noted that under certain circumstances, 6'
"the Board might properly find as a matter of fact that the succes-
sor had assumed the obligations under the old contract."' This
assumption would be founded on an agreement, express or implied.
Because in Burns the employers were competitive bidders, the cir-
cumstances necessary for an implied assumption can never be
present.
C. Wiley Revisited
In deciding the contractual questions raised by Burns, the Court
was faced with two alternatives: (i) H. K. Porter's interpretation of
section 8(d) rendering the Board powerless to compel either
party to agree to any substantive contractual provision of a col-
51 Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348, 350, 74 L.R.R.M.
1098 (1970).
"'William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 911 (2d
Cir. 1971).
11 NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
59 406 U.S. at 282.
60 406 U.S. at 286.
"E.g., Perma Vinyl Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 968, 65 L.R.R.M. 1168 (1967) (a
finding of subterfuge). Subterfuge occurs when the new employer is a disguised
continuance of the old employer or when the business is transferred as a means
of evading liability under the Act.
INLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 291 (1972). The
Court indicated this was possible in situations involving a merger, stock acquisi-
tion, reorganization or purchase of assets; all involve the typical successor situa-
tions.
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lective-bargaining agreement;" or (ii) John Wiley & Sons' finding
that all rights of employees under a prior contract are not auto-
matically terminated by a change in ownership and that these
rights could be enforced through the arbitration clause in the pre-
existing contract."' Neither of these decisions controlled the con-
tractual issue in Burns, but the logical extension of either would be
decisive.
The Court followed the Porter rationale and limited Wiley to
hold that the arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining contract
is all that survives a change in ownership. Collective bargaining is
the essential ingredient of this policy' and Porter's interpretation of
section 8(d) fosters this process. If Wiley were extended to its
logical conclusion, the Board would have the power to interfere
with the collective bargaining process in successor situations. Since
Wiley recognized that arbitration was, "part and parcel of the col-
lective bargaining process," a limitation of the case to this pro-
cedure allows the Court to square Burns with the rationale behind
the Act.
The Court, in distinguishing Wiley by stating that Burns did not
involve a section 301 action or the duty to arbitrate," was indicating
that arbitration remained as a viable means of enforcing certain
vested rights against a successor. The burden of protecting em-
ployees against a sudden change in ownership is now on the union
bargaining representative, rather than the employer or the Board.
Therefore, union bargaining representatives will have to negotiate
for liberal arbitration clauses in their contracts during the collective
bargaining process.
III. CONCLUSION
In imposing the bargaining obligation upon Bums, the Supreme
Court gave recognition to the successor doctrine as it had been
applied by the Board, but distinguished the Burns successor situa-
'
3 H.K. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970).
4John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 548 (1964).
'IS. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935); NLRB v. Pennsylvania
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 266 (1938). See note 20 supra.
" John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964); United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960).67NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 286 (1972).
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tion from one involving an agreement between employers. This
distinction determines if and when the duty to bargain arises. In the
usual successor situation, the duty is imposed immediately, but the
imposition is not automatic in a "no agreement" situation. The
duty arose only when Bums hired as a majority of his work force
employees already represented by a certified union. This time lag
allows a Burns-type employer to set initial terms of employment,
differing from those of his predecessor. The distinction also indi-
cates that a Burns-type employer can completely avoid a successor's
bargaining obligation simply by refusing to hire his predecessor's
employees.
In addition, the Court determined that the Act does not require
a successor to honor a pre-existing collective-bargaining contract.
Although a contrary result was possible under the Wiley doctrine,
the decision in Burns fosters the policy of the National Labor Re-
lations Act by promoting the collective bargaining process rather
than by requiring an agreement. Although Burns severly limits the
scope of Wiley, employees can still enforce vested rights previously
arbitrable under a prior contract by instituting a section 301 action
to compel arbitration of these rights against the successor.
Joseph A. Kral, III
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